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H.J. Inc.: Targeting Federal RICO's Pattern
Requirement to Long-Term Organized Criminal Activity
On June 26, 1989, the Supreme Court issued yet another statement on the
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act: H.J. Inc.
v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.1 Led by Justice Brennan, the five-member major-
ity instructed the lower courts as to what a "pattern of racketeering activity"
did not entail. Additionally, the justices endeavored to explain in extremely gen-
eral terms what they believed the term did require. Almost immediately, a host
of opinions appeared from the federal judiciary trying to apply this new decree
to the myriad of RICO cases before them. This Comment will review federal
and state case law pertaining to RICO's pattern requirement prior to H.J. Inc.,
examine this recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court, and organize the
numerous decisions appearing on this issue in an attempt to provide consistency
and uniformity to this elusive concept.
I. INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL RICO
In 1970, Congress adopted federal RICO,2 largely to promote the eradica-
tion of organized crime nationwide.3 Towards this end, severe criminal penal-
ties4 and a broad venue and process provision 5 were provided. Section 1962 of
RICO, entitled "Prohibited Activities," defines four specific offenses: (a) the use
of income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest
in or establish an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce; (b)
the acquisition or maintenance of any interest in an enterprise through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity; (c) the conduct or participation in the conduct of
an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; and (d) conspiring to
violate any of these provisions.' All four of the prohibited activities operate
upon the same set of definitions.7 These terms are decidedly broad so as "to
avoid creating loopholes for clever defendants and their lawyers." 8
1. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988). Adopted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922.
3. Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452 § 1, 84
Stat. 922, 923, 1970 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1073. See also H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2903; Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479. 513-23 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 26 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
5. Id. at § 1965.
6. Id. at § 1962. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 482-83; H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2897.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
8. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 1984), affd on other
grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) (per curiam). See Russello, 464 U.S. at 21 (noting "the pattern of the RICO
statute in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth"); H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2905 ("Congress drafted RICO
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The most commonly invoked provision of RICO is Section 1962(c).9 The
essential elements consist of "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a
pattern (4) of racketeering activity."' 0 Those persons" employed by or associ-
ated with such an enterprise are criminally and civilly liable for conducting or
participating, directly or indirectly, in the enterprise's affairs.' 2 The first ele-
ment, conduct, is not, for all practical purposes, a limiting term and "simply
means the performance of activities necessary or helpful to the operation of the
enterprise."" a An enterprise is broadly defined in the statute 4 and covers essen-
tially any union or group of individuals associated in fact.' 5 Perhaps the most
concrete term is racketeering activity, which describes any act chargeable or
indictable under certain federal and state criminal offenses specified in the stat-
ute.'6 These acts are commonly called predicate offenses. The final element, a
pattern of racketeering activity, will be discussed at length in this Comment.
broadly enough to encompass a wide range of criminal activity, taking many different forms and likely to attract a
broad array of perpetrators operating in many different ways"); Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 855
F.2d 241, 242 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Congress wrote RICO in broad, sweeping terms to combat the many, varied,
anfractuous ways in which racketeers operate"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1531 (1989). Congress expressly declared
that RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 947, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONo. & ADMIN. NEWS 4036. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497-98.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly,
in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlaw-
ful debt.
10. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496.
11. As defined in RICO, a "'person' includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial
interest in property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1988). One circuit has required that "the RICO person must be one
that either poses or has posed a continuous threat of engaging in acts of racketeering." Delta Truck, 855 F.2d at
242. See also Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 425 (5th Cir. 1990).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988). See United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 533 (2d Cir. 1989) (necessary
connection between person and enterprise is established if enterprise enables defendant to commit predicate acts
or otherwise relates to these offenses); United States v. Marren, 890 F.2d 924, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1989) (individual
is subject to RICO for knowingly participating in the commission of two predicate acts); Gussin v. Shockey, 725
F. Supp. 271, 277 (D. Md. 1989) (defendant must associate himself with the enterprise with a purpose to violate
the act); Casperone v. Landmark Oil & Gas Corp., 819 F.2d 112, 115 (5th Cir. 1987) (defendant need not
personally commit the predicate acts provided evidence is sufficient to connect him to fraudulent scheme).
13. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970 (1 1th Cir. 1986)
(citing United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981), affid on other grounds sub nom. Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983)).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988) states: "'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, associ-
ation, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."
See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-87 (1981).
15. In Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-81, the Court expressly held that enterprises include both legitimate and
illegitimate entities. An enterprise may consist of a number of otherwise separate and distinct entities where they
have been connected by a pattern of racketeering activity. United States v. Stolfi, 889 F.2d 378, 380 (2d Cir.
1989). Courts generally require that the defendant/person be separate and distinct from the enterprise and indi-
vidually identified in the pleadings. Landry, 901 F.2d at 425; Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481,
1489 (6th Cir. 1989) (listing cases); Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 881 (5th Cir. 1989). This does not mean, of
course, that such a person cannot be a member of the illegal enterprise. Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 729-
30 (2d Cir. 1987); Benard v. Hoff, 727 F. Supp. 211, 214-15 (D. Md. 1989). In contrast to subsection (c) of
section 1962, subsection (a) allows an enterprise alone to be held liable regardless of whether a separate person
exists. Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990). Similarly, a RICO action may be maintained
under subsection (b) of section 1962 even though a distinct person apart from the enterprise has not been identi-
fied. Landry, 901 F.2d at 425.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 481-82.
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To supplement criminal enforcement of RICO's prohibitions, Congress pro-
vided a civil cause of action in Section 1964(c) for those persons whose business
or property had been injured by a violation of RICO.17 Treble damages, costs,
and attorney fees were guaranteed to those who could successfully establish a
claim for relief.18 A civil plaintiff may procure these generous awards once the
necessary elements are established by a mere preponderance of the evidence. 9
This extraordinary civil remedy was included in RICO after astonishingly
little debate.20 Senator McClellan, a prominent sponsor of the bill, believed this
civil remedy would become "a major new tool in extirpating the baneful influ-
ence of organized crime in our economic life."'" To some members of Congress,
however, the statute's potentially far-reaching applications were readily
apparent. 2
Although difficult to quantify, federal RICO suits have unquestionably had
a substantial impact upon U.S. jurisprudence. Some commentators have ex-
pressed dismay at the statute's continually broadening scope and the exotic ap-
plications it has fostered.2 3 Others have offered dire predictions of a crippling
overload of the federal judiciary as a result of increasing RICO litigation.2 4
Certainly, invocation of civil RICO against the traditional professional criminal
is now the exception and not the rule.2 5 However, a strong argument exists that
RICO claims produce relatively few "wholly new pieces of litigation" as they
are typically appended to complaints already based upon a number of indepen-
dent theories of relief.26 Nevertheless, federal RICO is frequently applied in a
wide variety of legal fields and shows no signs of abatement.
II. THE PATTERN REQUIREMENT BEFORE SEDIMA
Perhaps the knottiest element of a RICO case is the pattern requirement.
This evasive concept is a necessary element of any claim under the statute.27 It
ensures that RICO is not employed against the isolated or sporadic offender and
thus protects the "ordinary run of commercial transactions" and avoids com-
plete preemption of state criminal laws.2 8
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
18. Id.
19. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491-93.
20. Id. at 507 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 132 CONG. REc. H9371 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (remarks of Repre-
sentative Boucher).
21. 116 CONG. REC. 25, 190 (1970). See also 116 CONG. REC. 35, 295 (1970) (remarks of Representative
Pof).
22. 116 CONG. REC. 35, 204 (1970) (remarks of Representative Mikva).
23. P. BATISTA, CIVIL Rico PRACTICE MANUAL 1-2 (1987).
24. 132 CONG. REc. H9371 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (remarks of Representative Boucher); id. at H9374
(remarks of Representative Feighan). But see J. RAKOFF & H. GOLDSTEIN, RICO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW
STRATEGY § 2.0311], at 2-20 (1989) (arguing that the expected deluge of RICO filings never materialized).
25. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 n.16 (citing ABA Task Force Report).
26. Blakey, The Origin and Promise of Civil RICO, in CIVIL RICO: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION LITIGATION A-7-8 (1988).
27. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2897; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 & n.14. "The articulation of a coherent definition
of 'pattern' is essential to the rational development of RICO law." Medallion Television Enter. v. SelecTV, 833
F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3241 (1989).
28. Menasco, Inc. v. Wasserman, 886 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1989).
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To establish a violation of Section 1962, a plaintiff or prosecutor must
demonstrate that a pattern of racketeering exists.2 9 The statutory definition pro-
vides that:
"[P]attern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,
one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter [enacted Oct. 15, 1970]
and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprison-
ment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity. 0
Prior to 1985, judicial analysis of this term was rare and generally under-
taken only in criminal cases.31 In the broadest readings published, several courts
required only the commission of two or more predicate offenses that related to
or had an impact upon the affairs of the enterprise.32 This expansive application
effectively demanded no more than two distinct allegations of racketeering
through the enterprise given that any offense committed by the entity will nec-
essarily relate to it and impact its affairs. Despite its stark shortcomings, this
view was shared by a majority of the federal courts for some time, 33 largely to
further the eradication of organized crime.34
In an attempt to give the pattern requirement more substance, other courts
demanded that at least two predicate acts relate to a single scheme or criminal
episode.35 Thus, an organized band of hoodlums who purchased narcotics one
day and burglarized an apartment the next, without more, would not fall within
this somewhat more restrictive definition. However, if this same enterprise used
the proceeds of the burglary to finance their drug dealings, the pattern require-
ment would be met. While this narrower construction is somewhat more satisfy-
ing, the concept of relatedness remains inherently expansive. It is rare that two
predicate acts are dissimilar in every respect save for the necessary fact that
they were committed by the same enterprise. Recognizing this infirmity, the
district court in United States v. Stofsky borrowed the special offender sentenc-
ing definition of pattern from another portion of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, of which RICO is a part, to add concreteness to the requirement of
relatedness. 36 That transplanted provision states: "[C]riminal conduct forms a
pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes,
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a)-(d) (1988).
30. Id. at § 1961(5).
31. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1276 (7th Cir. 1989); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE - AmERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION. COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: CIVIL RICO LITIGATION 128, 130 (1985) [hereinafter
ALI-ABA]. Examples of civil applications during this period include Exeter Towers Assoc. v. Bowditch, 604 F.
Supp. 1547 (D. Mass. 1985) and Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1981). See
generally PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CIVIL RICO 1988 109-11 (1988) [hereinafter PLI].
32. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980);
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States
v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 438 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). Legislative support for this
broad view may be found in 116 CONG. Rac. 35, 295 (1970) (remarks of Representative Poff).
33. O'Neill, Elements of a RICO Action, in RICO: THE ULTIMATE WEAPON IN BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION C-2 (T.G. Reed ed. 1983).
34. See, e.g., Elliott, 571 F.2d at 899 & n.23.
35. United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402, 411-12 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981);
United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); United States v.
Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978).
36. 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
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results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are inter-
related by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events."11
Also during this early period, at least one court toyed with the concept of
temporal relations between the two predicate acts. In United States v. Moeller,
then District Court Judge John 0. Newman noted that a more common sense
interpretation of a pattern did not include "two acts occurring at the same place
on the same day in the course of a single criminal episode.13 8 These insightful
comments were reduced to mere dicta, unfortunately, as the court was bound by
precedent to construe the pattern requirement broadly.39 Judge Newman's rea-
soning was not widely followed in subsequent cases that did squarely confront
this question.40
III. THE PATTERN REQUIREMENT AFTER SEDIMA
In mid-1985, the Supreme Court concluded its first foray into RICO's civil
provisions. As one federal judge succinctly stated afterwards, the Supreme
Court's opinion in Sedima"1 created a "whole new ballgame." 42 Writing for a
five-member majority, Justice White eliminated two harsh restrictions read into
RICO by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In no uncertain terms, the
Court rejected both the view that treble damages were available only against
those who had already been criminally convicted of the predicate acts43 and the
prerequisite that a civil plaintiff demonstrate an injury caused by an activity
RICO was designed to deter (the RICO injury). 44 While recognizing that these
judicially created restrictions were established to curb the use of civil RICO
against legitimate businesses, the Court, surprisingly, blamed these extraordi-
nary applications upon "the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a
meaningful concept of 'pattern.'""
Having thus rebuked the lower courts, the majority offered the narrowest
definition of the term yet conceived. In a now famous footnote,46 Justice White
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e), repealed and replaced by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, Title II, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1837 (1987).
38. 402 F. Supp. 49, 57 (D. Conn. 1975).
39. Id. at 58 (citing Parness, 503 F.2d at 438). See ALI-ABA, supra note 31, at 129.
40. O'Neill, supra note 33, at C-3.
41. 473 U.S. 479.
42. Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 833 (N.D. 11. 1985).
43. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488-93.
44. Id. at 493-500.
45. Id. at 499-500. The Court also noted that this phenomena was due, in part, to "the breadth of the
predicate offenses." Id. at 500. See also Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 38 (3d
Cir. 1987) ("The Sedima dictum has been widely viewed as a signal to the federal courts to fashion a limiting
construction of RICO around the pattern requirement ..
46. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14, states:
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a
"pattern of racketeering activity" differs from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it states that a pattern
"requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," § 1961(5) (emphasis added), not that it "means" two
such acts. The implication is that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in
common parlance two of anything do not generally form a "pattern." The legislative history supports the
view that two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern. As the Senate Report
explained: "The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business
normally requires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effec-
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reasoned that the statutory definition of a pattern merely set forth a minimum
requirement: two acts of racketeering activity.47 What else was necessary was
left for the national judiciary to resolve. 8
The Court then turned to the scant legislative history available. Citing a
passage from a Senate Report 9 and quips from a pair of congressional spon-
sors,50 two axioms were delineated: (1) A pattern does not include sporadic ac-
tivity; and (2) nor does it encompass isolated offenses.51 As employed in the
footnote, sporadic is the temporal term while isolated describes the identity be-
tween the predicate acts. Working backwards, the Court adopted the Senate
Report reasoning that the converse, continuity plus relationship, combined to
produce a pattern. 52 Since resolution of Sedima did not turn upon an interpreta-
tion of the pattern of racketeering activity requirement, footnote fourteen was
clearly dicta.5 3 Considering its source and statutory underpinnings, however,
this passage was nevertheless entitled to substantial deference by the lower
courts.54
Unquestionably, this esoteric analysis exudes confusion. The majority
therefore proffered another interpretative aid. Without citation to the twelve-
year-old Stofsky55 opinion, the Court pointed to the pattern definition for spe-
cial offender sentencing5" contained in the same bill.57 Unfortunately, this provi-
sion applies only to the relationship concept of the RICO pattern and does not
assist with the more perplexing continuity problem. Even then, it does little
tive. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern." S. REP. No.
91-617, p. 158 (1969) (emphasis added). Similarly, the sponsor of the Senate bill, after quoting this
portion of the Report, pointed out to his colleagues that "[t]he term 'pattern' itself requires the showing of
a relationship . . . . So, therefore, proof of two acts of racketeering activity, without more, does not
establish a pattern... !' 116 CONG. REC. 18940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan). See also id., at
35193 (statement of Rep. Poff) (RICO "not aimed at the isolated offender"); House Hearings, at 665.
Significantly, in defining "pattern" in a later provision of the same bill, Congress was more enlightening:
"[C]riminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events." 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e). This language may be useful in inter-
preting other sections of the Act. Cf. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975).
This passage is one of the "most often quoted footnotes in Supreme Court history." BATisTA, supra note 23, at 71.
47. Id. See D. ROBERTS, RICO: LAW, PRACnC, AND PROCEDURE 14-15 (1986).
48. See Note, Clarifying a 'Pattern' of Confusiorn A Multi-Factor Approach to Civil RICO's Pattern Re-
quirement, 86 MICH. L. Rav. 1745, 1760-62 (1988) (arguing that the inherent ambiguity of § 1961(5) dispelled
any hopes that a plain meaning would be discerned and required courts to look outside this language for
guidance).
49. S. RaP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1969).
50. 116 CONG. Rc,. 18, 940 (1970) (statement of Senator McClellan); 116 CONG. R~a. 35, 193 (1970)
(statement of Representative Poll).
51. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
52. Id.
53. See United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987).
54. See United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1381 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 56 (1989).
One federal district court judge boldly declared that this "unmistakable signal from the Supreme Court" permit-
ted longstanding appellate court precedent on point to be discarded. Northern Trust, 615 F. Supp. at 833. See
generally BATSTA, supra note 23, at 73-74 n.29.
55. 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 819 (1976). See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
56. Supra note 37 and accompanying text.
57. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
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more than set forth several factors a lower court might consider in resolving this
particular aspect of a RICO pattern.
Despite the new ambiguities created, the Supreme Court's unexpected dis-
course into the pattern provision guaranteed that this element would become
"the battleground on which motions to dismiss civil RICO claims [would] now
be fought."58 Discussions of the once-neglected pattern requirement began to
appear in an extraordinary number of opinions after Sedima.5 9 Not surpris-
ingly, numerous conflicts quickly emerged among the lower courts.8 0 These
cases can be categorized in three general groups: restrictive, expansive, and
middle-of-the-road. 61
A. The Restrictive Approach: Pattern Requires At Least Two Distinct Crimi-
nal Schemes
The most restrictive interpretation of the pattern requirement was an-
nounced by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Superior Oil Co. v.
Fulmer.62 Rather than confining itself to the phraseology contained in the stat-
ute, the court injected the criminal term "scheme." 683 This concept comprised
the total of predicate acts committed in furtherance of a criminal objective in-
volving the same participants and victims." No matter how many acts of racke-
teering were involved, a RICO complaint was insufficient if it merely alleged
that a single scheme had taken place.6 5 Two judges of the Eighth Circuit openly
criticized this view, finding it to be inconsistent with the specific wording of the
statute.6
All of the other circuits expressly rejected this restrictive approach to the
pattern requirement. 7 Reference to criminal schemes accomplished little more
than the substitute of "one set of definitional problems for another." 68 Courts
that preferred to analyze the pattern requirement on a multifactored case-by-
case basis refused to adopt such hard-line rules.8" Other jurists simply reasoned
58. ALI-ABA, supra note 31, at 127. See also, BATISTA, supra note 23, at 66 (Sedima "was the watershed
event in the history of civil RICO."); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 501 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The Court's interpreta-
tion of the civil RICO statute quite simply revolutionizes private litigation. ... ); Pezzulli & Kinser, Pleading a
RICO Case, in CIVIL RICO AFTER SEDIMA_ A PRACTIoNER's GUIDE TO RACKETEERING INFLUENCED CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS LIIGATION 10 (1986) ("[n]ew focus in RICO cases will be in the area of 'pattern of racketeer-
ing activity' ").
59. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1276 (7th Cir. 1989).
60. See Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898, 908-10 (2d Cir. 1987) (Pratt, J., dissenting); Morris v. Gilbert, 649
F. Supp. 1491, 1502 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
61. Accord PLI, supra note 31, at 120-45.
62. 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
63. Id. at 257.
64. See 4 RICO Law Reporter 666 (May 1987).
65. Fulmer, 785 F.2d at 257.
66. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648, 650-51 (8th Cir. 1987) (McMillian, J., concur-
ring), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989); id. at 651 (Gibson, J., concurring).
67. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2898 & n.2.
68. Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 1987). See also Barticheck v. Fidelity Union
Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987); Sun Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 193
(9th Cir. 1987).
69. Roeder, 814 F.2d at 31; United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1383 (2d Cir. 1989); International
Data Bank, Ltd., v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987).
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that Congress did not intend to exclude from RICO criminal acts of racketeer-
ing that happened to fall within a single scheme.1 0 Nevertheless, the multiple
schemes requirement persisted in the Eighth Circuit.
7 1
Despite its unpopularity among the federal appellate courts, variants upon
this approach have appeared in several district court opinions. In Northwest
Trust Bank/O'Hare v. Inryco, Inc. the court announced that a RICO pattern
"presumes repeated criminal activity, not merely repeated acts to carry out the
same criminal activity. 71 2 This dubious distinction is almost purely semantical
and does little to solidify the pattern requirement.7 3 Nevertheless, a subsequent
opinion took Inryco one step further and demanded separate criminal episodes
sufficiently unconnected in time and substance.7 4 By creating a complicated
analysis involving related predicate acts and unconnected episodes, the court
threatened to confine RICO to a small band of eccentric factual settings .7 Like
the multiple schemes requirement, neither the repeated criminal activity nor the
unconnected episodes rules enjoyed much support in subsequent case law.
B. The Expansive Approach: A Pattern Only Requires Two Distinct Predi-
cate Acts
At the other extreme, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits endorsed an
extremely expansive interpretation of the RICO pattern. In R.A.G.S. Couture,
Inc. v. Hyatt,76 the unanimous panel held that the mailing of two allegedly
fraudulent letters within five months from different defendants was a sufficient
pattern so as to withstand summary judgment.7 7 In this court's opinion, Sedima
implied only that the predicate acts may not be isolated.78 There can be little
doubt that the court was entirely correct when it conceded that this interpreta-
tion "stretches the statutory language to its limit." 7 Dissatisfied with this rea-
soning, several judges on the Fifth Circuit called for an en banc reconsideration
of R.A.G.S. Couture.80
In similar fashion, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits joined forces to fashion
an equally broad pattern definition. The Eleventh Circuit began in United
70. Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1383; Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 39; International Data Bank, 812 F.2d at 155.
71. See Phoenix Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Shearson Locb Rhoades, Inc., 856 F.2d 1125, 1128 (8th Cir.
1988); United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 858 (8th Cir. 1987); H.J. Inc., 829 F.2d at 650; Ornest v.
Delaware North Companies, Inc., 818 F.2d 651, 656 (8th Cir. 1987); Madden v. Gluck, 815 F.2d 1163, 1164 (8th
Cir. 1987); Deviries v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir. 1986); Holmberg v. Morrisette,
800 F.2d 205, 210 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 950 (8th Cir. 1986).
72. 615 F. Supp. 828, 831 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (emphasis in original). See generally BATSTA, supra note 23, at
72-75.
73. See Sun Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1987).
74. Medallion TV Enters., Inc. v. SelecTV, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1290, 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
75. See Sun Savings, 825 F.2d at 193-94.
76. 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985).
77. Id. at 1355.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1351.
80. Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 1987); Crocker v. Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 348 n.2 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988); Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc.
v. J.J. Case Co., 855 F.2d 241, 243 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1988).
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States v. Watchmaker8l by rejecting the multiple schemes requirement.8 2 In
that case, the defendant, a member of a notorious motorcycle gang, was ulti-
mately charged with shooting three police officers.83 Relying on the Sixth Cir-
cuit's analysis in United States v. Licavoli,84 the panel held that a pattern ex-
isted when two separate violations of state or federal law were established. 85
This rationalization produced a surprising result: the conspiracy to commit and
actual commission of a predicate act could by themselves constitute a pattern of
racketeering activity. Thus in Licavoli, the conspiracy to murder and the mur-
der itself were enough to indict organized crime members for a violation of
RICO since both acts comprised distinct violations of state law."' A pattern of
racketeering activity was found to exist even though the defendants had en-
gaged in a single criminal episode involving one victim over a very brief period
of time. In order to preclude this result, one model state RICO statute expressly
declares that a pattern is not formed by acts comprising a single event.8 7
After Sedima, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed Watchmaker in Bank of
America v. Touche Ross & Co."8 While its precise holding is unclear, the court
seemingly required only two related predicate acts comprising separate statu-
tory violations to establish a RICO pattern." Although the panel made a pass-
ing reference to Sedima's continuity element, there was no discussion as to how
it was satisfied by the facts presented. In like fashion, the Sixth Circuit upheld
Licavoli and endorsed Watchmaker in United States v. Jennings.91 The unani-
mous panel repeatedly stated that a RICO pattern required only two acts of
racketeering activity.92 No reference was made to Sedima or the concepts of
continuity and relatedness. Both the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits thus joined the
Fifth Circuit in declaring that two related predicate acts would form a pattern
of racketeering activity if each comprised a separate violation of state or federal
law.93
C. The Middle-of-the-Road Approach: A Pattern Must Be Discerned From a
Multiplicity of Factors
The approach a majority of the federal circuits adopted after Sedima em-
ployed a case-by-case analysis devoid of rigid rules. These courts generally ac-
81. 761 F.2d 1459 (lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986).
82. Id. at 1475.
83. Id. at 1477.
84. 725 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252.
85. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d at 1475 (also citing United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. Unit B
1981), cert. denied, sub nom. Meinster v. United States, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982)).
86. Licavoll, 725 F.2d at 1047.
87. Criminally Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act § 5(j)(1)(iv) (1985), reprinted in, A COMPREHEN-
SIVE PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RICO LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION: A REPORT OF THE RICO
CASES COMMITTEE 29 (1985).
88. 782 F.2d 966, 971 (lth Cir. 1986).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 970-71.
91. 842 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1988).
92. Id. at 162-64.
93. See Chepiga & Khuzami, The Evolving Concept of "'Pattern" Under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CIVIL RICO 1988 122-23 (1988).
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cepted the Supreme Court's suggestion that a RICO pattern requires both relat-
edness and continuity."' To determine whether these elements exist, a variety of
factors were consulted. 95
Few courts struggled with the concept of relatedness. The general question
asked was whether the predicate acts "may be viewed as having a common
purpose" and were not sporadic.9 6 Predicate acts that furthered a single crimi-
nal scheme were found to be per se related.97 In other cases, courts found refer-
ence to the special sentencing pattern definition98 to be helpful as suggested in
Sedima.99
Analysis of the continuity element proved far more troubling. This amor-
phous concept was regarded as requiring that the predicate acts "occur over
time and perhaps threaten to recur." 100 The first opinion after Sedima to force-
fully advocate a multifactor approach to continuity was Morgan v. Bank of
Waukegan.'0' Steering a self-described middle course between two extremes,
continuity was described as requiring that "the predicate acts must be ongoing
over an identified period of time so that they can fairly be viewed as constitut-
ing separate transactions." 02 Rather than end its analysis with this vague defi-
nition, that court offered five relevant factors for determining whether a pattern
of racketeering activity exists: (1) the number and variety of predicate acts; (2)
the length of time over which the predicate acts were committed; (3) the num-
ber of victims; (4) the presence of separate schemes; and (5) the infliction of
distinct injuries.L03 Characterizing this approach as "a standard, not a rule," the
Morgan court expressly acknowledged that no one factor is necessarily determi-
native.10 4 Applying this analysis to the facts before it, a single scheme over four
94. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. Opinions adopting the Court's relatedness and continuity analysis after
Sedima are obviously too numerous to list here but examples include Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925,
928-29 (10th Cir. 1987), and Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975-77 (7th Cir. 1986). It was noted
in Sun Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 192 (9th Cir. 1987), however, that "the Supreme Court
does not enshrine 'continuity plus relationship' as a determinative two-pronged test"; see also United States v.
Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1383 (2d Cir. 1989). The Sun Savings court argued that reference to those concepts
was made only to aid in weeding out isolated and sporadic acts from the scope of RICO. 825 F.2d at 192. In
Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 38-39 (3d Cir. 1987), the court implied that
characterizations such as continuous and related are too abstract, requiring a multifactor approach to the pattern
requirement. Most courts, however, view the multifactor analysis as a means of determining whether relatedness
and continuity, and hence a RICO pattern, do exist. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Big Apple Industrial
Buildings, Inc., 879 F.2d 10, 15-19 (2d Cir. 1989). Some opinions employing the multifactor view have preferred
to use the terms sporadic and isolated rather than related and continuous. See Sun Savings, 825 F.2d at 194. This
distinction apparently arises merely as a difference in choice of phraseology, however, and has no meaningful
impact upon multifactor pattern analysis.
95. See generally Huestis, RICO: The Meaning of 'Pattern' Since Sedima, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 621
(1988) (advocating fact-based approach utilizing a variety of different factors).
96. Procter & Gamble, 879 F.2d at 17.
97. See Sun Sav., 825 F.2d at 192.
98. See supra note 42.
99. See Procter & Gamble, 879 F.2d at 16-17; United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1374 (2d Cir.
1989) (citing United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afid on other grounds, 527 F.2d 237
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976)).
100. Procter & Gamble, 879 F.2d at 17.
101. 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986). See BATiSTA, supra note 23, at 87-89.
102. 804 F.2d at 975.
103. Id. See also Jones v. Lampe, 845 F.2d 755, 757 (7th Cir. 1988).
104. 804 F.2d at 976. See also Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 31 (lst Cir. 1987).
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years involving mail fraud in connection with a loan transaction and two sepa-
rate foreclosures was found to present a RICO pattern. 0 5
While Morgan's separate transactions characterization was never widely
cited, its multifactor approach enjoyed substantial support among the other fed-
eral circuits."0 6 Neither the presence of a single scheme' nor a single victim'08
precluded some courts from finding that a RICO pattern existed. Similarly,
closed schemes over a period of a few months were also found, under special
circumstances, to present a pattern. 10 9 More often, however, a short-lived
scheme with a single discrete objective presenting no threat of future criminal
activity was usually found to be an isolated event." 0 An ongoing scheme, on the
other hand, posing a substantial risk of continued racketeering was sufficient to
satisfy the pattern requirement even though it lacked multiple victims and a
sustained period of unlawful conduct."' Conversely, alleged criminal conduct
spanning several years did not present a RICO pattern where counterveiling
non-durational factors so indicated.1 2
The presence of multiple victims was found by some courts to be a strong
indication that a pattern of racketeering activity exists." 3 This is especially true
where each victim was injured by separate predicate acts." 4 Racketeering activ-
ity which displayed a variety of crimes was clearly suggestive of a pattern if
such acts were still otherwise related." 5 The raw number of predicate acts
presented was also highly relevant to this inquiry. However, several courts ques-
tioned whether this easily identified factor was being afforded too much weight
105. 804 F.2d at 976.
106. See Chepiga & Khuzami, supra note 93, at 123-25.
107. See, e.g., Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d 1356, 1367 (7th Cir. 1988); Liquid Air v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297,
1303-05 (7th Cir. 1987); Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027-28 (7th cir. 1987); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett,
875 F.2d 1271, 1279 (7th Cir. 1989); Bank of America v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 971 (11th Cir.
1986); United Energy Owners, Inc. v. United Energy Management Sys., Inc., 837 F.2d 356, 361 (9th Cir. 1988);
California Arch. Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1987).
108. See, e.g., Appley, 832 F.2d at 1027-28; Liquid Air, 834 F.2d at 1303-05.
109. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, 875 F.2d at 1279; California Arch., 818 F.2d at 1469. See also Barticheck v.
Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987) (rejecting "view that racketeering acts
committed pursuant to a single scheme can constitute a RICO pattern only if the scheme is potentially ongoing or
open-ended"). Id.
110. See, e.g., Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 928-29 (10th Cir. 1987); Lipin Enterprises, Inc. v.
Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986); International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 154-55 (4th Cir.
1987); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 31 (4th Cir. 1987); Beauford v. Helmsley, 843 F.2d 103, 110
(2d Cir. 1988); Medallion Television Enter. v. SeledcTV, Inc., 833 F.2d 1360, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1987); Jarvis v.
Regan, 833 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1987); Garbade v. Great Divide Mining and Milling Corp., 831 F.2d 212, 214
(10th Cir. 1987); Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 450, 463, 534 N.Y.S.2d 152, 160 (1988).
111. Bumgarner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, 716 F. Supp. 493, 500 (D. Kan. 1988); Smith v.
MCI Telecommunications Corp., 678 F. Supp. 823, 827 (D. Kan. 1987); Wichita Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v.
Landmark Group, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 321, 331 (D. Kan. 1987); O'Connor v. Midwest Pipe Fabricators, Inc., 660
F. Supp. 696, 698-99 (D. Kan. 1987); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1986). One
court suggested that for a RICO pattern to exist in a completed scheme, a threat of continuity need appear only at
some point during the whole course of racketeering activity. Sun Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187,
194 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987).
112. See, e.g., HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 828 F.2d 1071, 1074-77 (4th Cir. 1987); Framingham Union Hospi-
tal, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 1478, 1484 (D. Mass. 1989).
113. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, 875 F.2d at 1279; California Arch., 818 F.2d at 1469; United Energy Owners
Committee, Inc. v. United Energy Management Sys., Inc., 837 F.2d 356, 361 (9th Cir. 1988).
114. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, 875 F.2d at 1279.
115. See, e.g., id.
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especially when mail and wire fraud were involved. 16 Nevertheless, the view
was often expressed that repeated predicate acts upon one victim in one scheme
could establish a pattern of racketeering activity where numerous and distinct
economic injuries were suffered."1
Unquestionably, Morgan did not provide an exhaustive list of factors rele-
vant to the establishment of a continuous RICO pattern. Courts also considered,
in other contexts: (1) the number of participants; (2) the purpose of the activity;
and (3) whether the operation was ongoing or finite." 8 Analysis of these factors
necessarily required an examination beyond the bare criminal acts of racketeer-
ing presented and into both the entire enterprise and course of events which
transpired." 9
While generally applying the multifactor analysis to RICO patterns, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a unique approach to the question of
continuity.120 Prior to Sedima, the court had held that two otherwise unrelated
predicate acts by a single enterprise can suffice to satisfy the pattern require-
ment of RICO.' Noting that Sedima's footnote fourteen was simply dicta, this
early decision was reaffirmed in United States v. lanniello.2 2 While refusing to
narrow its pattern definition by adding the requirement of continuity, the court
nevertheless announced that this concept was properly viewed as an element of
a RICO enterprise."2 3 The panel ultimately held that relatedness and continuity
necessarily existed anytime "a person commits at least two acts that have the
common purpose of furthering a continuing criminal enterprise with which that
person is associated.""124 Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 12 5 reiterated
that a RICO pattern requires only two related predicate acts and not multiple
episodes."16 The court added, however, that a RICO enterprise must be a con-
tinuing, ongoing organization and not a mere short-term operation with one
straightforward goal." 7 Whether one examined continuity from the aspect of
the pattern or the enterprise was conceded by the Beck panel to be "really a
matter of form, not substance."1 28
116. See Ashland Oil, 875 F.2d at 1278-79; HMK Corp., 828 F.2d at 1074-77; Lipin Enterprises, Inc. v.
Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1986) (Cudahy, J., concurring); Elliot v. Chicago Motor Club Ins., 809 F.2d
347, 350 (7th Cir. 1986); International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1987); Roeder
v. Alpha Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 1987).
117. See, e.g., Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1304-05 (7th Cir. 1987); Midwest Grinding Co. v.
Spitz, 716 F. Supp. 1087 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
118. See Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987); Framingham
Union Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 1478, 1484 (D. Mass. 1989).
119. Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 39; United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1385-86 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oakes,
C.J., concurring).
120. See Chepiga & Khuzami, supra note 93, at 130-44; PLI, supra note 31, at 130-45.
121. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1121-23 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
122. 808 F.2d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1986).
123. Id. at 191.
124. Id. at 192.
125. 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1987).
126. Id. at 51.
127. Id. Compare cases cited supra note 110.
128. Id. See generally Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 450, 462-64, 534 N.Y.S.2d 152,
159-60 (1988) (state court reaching same result when applying federal RICO under both approaches).
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Finally in United States v. Indelicato,'"2 the Second Circuit abandoned its
peculiar approach to continuity. 13 Although continuity was no longer a require-
ment of a RICO enterprise, but of the pattern, the nature of the enterprise
could nevertheless "serve to show the threat of continuing activity."13' For ex-
ample, an enterprise whose everyday business involves the commission of predi-
cate acts clearly exhibits a threat of continued racketeering activity.13 2 Despite
this overlap in the proof required for a pattern and enterprise, the court empha-
sized that the the two terms still involved separate and distinct elements of a
RICO claim.' 33
When taken together, these various decisions espousing a multifactor ap-
proach fail to produce any concrete rules or principles. Lacking mechanical
tests to determine the existence of a RICO pattern, these courts relied instead
upon a case-by-case analysis which viewed the issue as "a matter of criminal
dimension and degree."' 3' While it is difficult to assess whether this approach
resulted in more civil awards and criminal convictions, it is likely that the aban-
donment of the bright-line rules made early dismissal on the pleadings far more
difficult to obtain. 35
IV. THE ARRIVAL OF H.J. INC. v. NORTHWESTERN BELL TEL. CO.
Recognizing the wide split that Sedima had created, the Supreme Court
opted to confront the pattern requirement head-on in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Tel. Co."' Petitioners, the customers of respondent Northwestern Bell
Telephone Company, alleged in this class action that the phone company had
paid bribes to members of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission over a six
year period.' 3" Bound to the dictates of Fulmer,3 8 the district court dismissed
the complaint as only a single scheme had been alleged."' The Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed,' 40 although two members of the panel
suggested that the court reconsider its test for a RICO pattern.,
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits' expansive interpretation by holding that a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity requires more than just multiple predicate acts." 2 Similarly, the entire
Court agreed that no support existed within the statute for the Eighth Circuit's
129. 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989).
130. Id. at 1381-85; see Dooner v. NMI Ltd., 725 F. Supp. 153, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
131. Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1383.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1384 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)).
134. International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987). See also Barticheck v.
Fidelity Union/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1987).
135. BATisTA, supra note 23, at 89.
136. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
137. Id. at 2897.
138. 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
139. 648 F. Supp. 419, 425 (D. Minn. 1986).
140. 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987).
141. Supra note 66 and accompanying text.
142. 109 S. Ct. at 2899-900. Justice Scalia's concurrence also expressed its support of this position, id. at
2908, allowing the Court to speak unanimously on this particular question.
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requirement of multiple schemes in a RICO pattern. 143 Having eliminated the
prevailing extremist views, the nine justices were unable to see eye to eye on
exactly what was required beyond multiple predicate acts for a RICO pattern
to exist.1
4
'
Following Sedima's footnote fourteen closely, Justice Brennan, writing for
the five member majority, attempted to provide concrete meaning to the con-
cepts of relatedness and continuity.14" Based upon its reading of the legislative
history, the Court reasoned that Congress had a "natural and commonsense
approach to RICO's pattern element in mind."u 46 The justices suggested "that a
pattern might be demonstrated by reference to a range of different ordering
principles or relationships between predicates, within the expansive bounds set"
by section 1961(5). 147 As in Sedima,148 relatedness was defined by reference to
the Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act,149 now partially repealed. 50 In
his separate concurrence, Justice Scalia doubted that Congress intended this
result since this sentencing provision was contained within the same act of
which RICO was a part but "was explicitly not rendered applicable to
RICO."' 51 He argued further that this transplanted pattern definition was ut-
terly uninformative and provided absolutely no meaningful limits. 52
Turning next to the continuity element, the majority maintained that
"[w]hat a plaintiff or prosecutor must prove is continuity of racketeering activ-
ity, or its threat, simpliciter."'5 3 Citing Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First
National State,'5 ' Justice Brennan described continuity as "both a closed- and
open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or
to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repe-
tition."' 55 The Court further stated that:
A party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by
proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time. Pred-
icate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal
conduct do not satisfy this requirement: Congress was concerned in RICO with long-
term criminal conduct. Often a RICO action will be brought before continuity can be
established in this way. In such cases, liability depends on whether the threat of con-
tinuity is demonstrated.156
143. Id. at 2899-900. Again, the concurring opinion shared this view, id. at 2909 (Scalia, J., concurring). For
the reactions of two of these lower courts see Smith v. Cooper/T. Smith Corp., 886 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Hobson, 893 F.2d 1267 (11th Cir. 1990).
144. 109 S. Ct. at 2908 (Scalia, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 2898-902.
146. Id. at 2899.
147. Id. at 2900.
148. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
149. Supra note 37 and accompanying text.
150. 109 S. Ct. at 2900-01.
151. Id. at 2907 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)) (emphasis
in original).
152. 109 S. Ct. at 2907 (Scalia, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 2901.
154. 832 F.2d 36 (3rd Cir. 1987).
155. 109 S. Ct. at 2902.
156. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Rather than list factors for lower courts to consider in their pattern analysis, the
Court offered three possible examples of how this element might be demon-
strated: (1) related predicate acts involving "a distinct threat of long-term rack-
eteering activity, either implicit or explicit"; (2) related predicate acts compris-
ing "part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business"; or (3) related
predicate acts which are a regular way of conducting the defendant's "ongoing
legitimate business (in the sense that it is not a business that exists for criminal
purposes), or of conducting or participating in an ongoing and legitimate RICO
'enterprise.' ,,157
The Court also rejected the contentions of various amici urging that the
RICO pattern be restricted to those activities traditionally viewed as character-
istic of organized crime. 158 The majority reasoned that like the multiple scheme
standard, this proposed condition was unsupported by the language of the stat-
ute and its legislative history.159
Applying this analysis to the facts presented, Justice Brennan had little
trouble determining that a RICO pattern had been sufficiently plead.160 The
complaint alleged an ongoing six year scheme by Northwestern Bell to secure
favorable rates through numerous bribes in several different forms.116 These
predicate acts of bribery shared a common purpose and thus satisfied the relat-
edness element.' 6' Furthermore, the considerable number of bribes were alleged
to have occurred frequently over a substantial period of time satisfying the con-
tinuity requirement.' 6' Alternatively, the Court acknowledged that "a threat of
continuity of racketeering activity might be established at trial by showing that
the alleged bribes were a regular way of conducting Northwestern Bell's ongo-
ing business, or a regular way of conducting or participating in the conduct of
the alleged and ongoing RICO enterprise."164
Justice Scalia and the three other concurring justices found the continuity
plus relationship analysis to be about as helpful as "life is a fountain.' 65 They
objected particularly to the continuity reasoning for allowing racketeers a safe
harbor within which to conduct their illegal activities during a closed period of
a few months regardless of "how many different crimes and different schemes
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2902-05. Amicus Curiae briefs were submitted on behalf of the Washington Legal Foundation,
American Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial Organizations, National Association of Manufacturers, and
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Id. at 2903 n.5.
159. Id. at 2903-05. Initially, the Court explained that RICO was not intended by its sponsors to be limited
simply to organized crime groups but also extended to individuals acting alone. Id. at 2903. While the legislature
has repeatedly employed "organized crime" restrictions in other statutes, it conspicuously failed to do so in RICO.
Id. Suggestions in the Act's preamble and remarks of various congressmen that RICO was enacted to combat
organized crime did not persuade the Court otherwise. Id. Indeed, the majority cited several instances where
sponsors of the original bill had expressly rejected calls to limit RICO to the traditional "mobster." Id. at 2904-
05. Citing Sedlma, 473 U.S. at 499, the Court reaffirmed its view that Congress had intended to reach both
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises through RICO. Id. at 2905.
160. Id. at 2906.
161. Id. at 2897-98, 2906.
162. Id. at 2906.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2907 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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are involved."' 166 On the other hand, the concurrence noted that the Court's
majority opinion made it more difficult for a potential offender to determine
whether his actions would fall within the amorphous scope of RICO.167 Conced-
ing that they were unable to provide a more satisfactory definition of a RICO
pattern, the four justices found the statute's inherent vagueness to be intolera-
ble.168 "That the highest Court in the land has been unable to derive from this
statute anything more than today's meager guidance bodes ill for the day when
[a constitutional] challenge is presented."'' 69 Undoubtedly, H.J. Inc. will not
stand long as the Court's last statement on federal RICO.27 0
V. THE PATTERN REQUIREMENT AFTER H.J. INC.
Predictably, H.J. Inc. spawned a host of opinions from the federal judici-
ary. As of this writing, this decision has been discussed at length by each of the
federal Circuit Courts of Appeal and was cited in numerous district court de-
crees.'17 At the other extreme, state court reference to H.J. Inc. has been rela-
tively rare. However, this inattention may disappear rapidly as the Supreme
Court recently affirmed that state courts enjoy subject matter jurisdiction over
federal RICO lawsuits.17 2
Despite Justice Scalia's dire predictions, H.J. Inc. appears, at least in the
early going, to have significantly focused judicial analysis of the pattern require-
ment. Moreover, at least one judge has openly indicated that this opinion has
greatly clarified this critical element of RICO. 7 A uniform approach to ana-
lyzing patterns of racketeering activity has thus begun to emerge. This system-
atic calculus may be subdivided into three general elements: two distinct acts of
racketeering activity, relatedness, and continuity.
A. Two Distinct Acts of Racketeering Activity
As a threshold demand, invocation of federal RICO requires the existence
of two distinct acts of racketeering activity. 74 This is the only prerequisite Con-
166. Id. at 2908 (Scalia, J., concurring).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2909 (Scalia, J., concurring).
170. RICO Decision Unlikely to Be the Final Word, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, July 10, 1989, at 5.
One circuit court of appeals has recently rejected a constitutional vagueness attack on the pattern requirement as
applied to an organized crime family. United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1178-80 (Ist Cir. 1990).
171. See infra notes 172-268 and cases cited therein.
172. Tafflin v. Levitt, I 10 S. Ct. 792 (1990). H.J. Inc. has been consulted, however, by state courts applying
their own state RICO statutes. Dover v. State, 192 Ga. App. 429, 385 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1989); Computer Con-
cepts, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Brandt, 98 Or. App. 618, 631, 780 P.2d 249, 256 (1989).
173. Walk v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 890 F.2d 688, 690 (4th Cir. 1989). But see Swistock v. Jones, 884
F.2d 755, 757 (3d Cir. 1989) ("the degree of concrete guidance provided by H.J. Inc. is open to debate");
Orchard Hills Coop. Apts. Inc. v. Germania Fed. S. & L. Assoc., 720 F. Supp. 127, 130 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (HiJ.
Inc.'s only substantive contribution is the striking of the multiple schemes requirement).
174. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14; H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2899; United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d
1141, 1163-64 (2d Cir. 1989); Callanan v. United States, 881 F.2d 229, 334-35 (6th Cir. 1989).
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gress expressly included in the plain language of the statute.' 5 An appropriate
starting point for the pattern analysis is thus provided.176 It is important to note
that not every illegal act constitutes racketeering activity as RICO only targets
certain crimes specified in the statute.Y77
In most cases, whether two distinct acts of racketeering activity have been
established will be a straightforward and easily resolvable question. 78 To be
safe, a plaintiff or prosecutor should allege every predicate act known at that
time in order to maximize the chances that at least two will survive. Difficulty
arises, however, when the only acts specified are so interrelated that they no
longer appear separate and distinct. This situation is not uncommon due to the
twin requirements of relatedness and continuity. Commentators have expressed
concern over the apparent tension between these two aims. 79 Nevertheless,
while the requirements of relatedness and continuity do compete, theirs is a
healthy competition and not at all troublesome. In both Sedirna180 and H.J.
Inc., 1" the Supreme Court explained that the predicate acts comprising the pat-
tern of racketeering activity must be related but not to the point where the
course of criminal activity was isolated in time. Conversely, while the element
of continuity is similarly required, it is not evidenced by sporadic acts even over
an extended period of time. By demanding both relatedness and continuity, the
Court targeted a specific field of conduct. Although not every series of related
predicate acts exhibits continuity and vice versa, only criminal activities that
display both elements present the sort of long term, organized criminal behavior
RICO seeks to eradicate.
When the alleged predicate offenses are so related that they blur together,
however, reference must be made, of course, to the applicable criminal statutes
which define the crimes. RICO's definition of racketeering activity employs
both state and federal prohibitions against specific forms of conduct. 82 The pre-
H.J. Inc. courts generally agreed that the phrase "acts of racketeering activity,"
as used in the pattern definition, 83 connotes two separately chargeable or in-
dictable offenses under the appropriate state or federal law.' 8" Stress must be
placed, however, on the requirement of two separate acts of racketeering activ-
175. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). See generally RAKOFF & GOLDSrIN, supra note 24, at § 1.04[2][a]
(1989).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Local 359, 889 F.2d 1232, 1234 (2d Cir. 1989), Shearin v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1166 (3d Cir. 1989); Dah Chong Hong, Ltd. v. Silk Greenhouse, Inc., 719 F. Supp.
1072, 1074 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). See Ferdinand Drexel Inv. Co. v. Alibert, 723 F. Supp. 313, 332 (E.D. Pa.
1989).
178. See, e.g., Shearin, 885 F.2d at 1166.
179. RAKOFs & GOLsSEIN, supra note 24, at § 1.04[2] [d]; ROBERTS, supra note 47, at 20. Various courts
have also discussed this issue. United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1383 (2d Cir. 1989); Morgan v. Bank of
Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986).
180. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
181. 109 S. Ct. at 2900.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
183. Id. at § 1961(5).
184. See, e.g., Bank of America v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 971 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (quoting United
States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1475 (11th Cir. 1985)); United States v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 159, 163 (6th
Cir. 1988).
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ity to satisfy this preliminary requirement. In United States v. Walgren, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with a single act, a telephone
call, which constituted both bribery and extortion. 8 5 The prosecution advanced
the theory that since two separate statutes were violated, the defendant was
chargeable for two criminal offenses as required for a pattern of racketeering
activity.' 86 The court rejected this approach by noting that the fact that the
phone conversation violated both state and federal law was purely fortuitous.8 7
The coincidence that the conduct alleged is prohibited by two statutes is a mere
byproduct of federalism and does not evince a pattern of racketeering activity.
Congress was more concerned with repeated criminal conduct. Therefore,
RICO requires two identifiable acts each chargeable or indictable under a spe-
cific state or federal law. 188
B. Relatedness
The relatedness element of a RICO pattern suggested in Sedima a9 was
left largely unchanged by H.J. Inc.90 Drawing insight from the Dangerous Spe-
cial Offender Sentencing Act,' 9' the Court advanced several distinguishing
characteristics that might exist between relevant acts demonstrating an interre-
lationship. 19 2 The purpose of this loose requirement is clear: to remove isolated
events from RICO's scope which do not evince organized and systematic crimi-
nal activity or the threat of such. 93
While the H.J. Inc. majority advised that, for analytical purposes, con-
tinuity and relatedness should be stated separately, 94 at least one federal appel-
late court has lumped the two together. In Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.,
the Third Circuit took the view that "the similarity of the acts" was just one of
many factors to be considered along with "the number of acts, the length of
time involved, . . . the number of victims, the number of perpetrators, and the
nature of the activities.' 895 By and large, these latter factors are relevant only
to the continuity element of a pattern. Under this approach, the court seems to
suggest that a RICO pattern can be discerned from disimilar acts so long as the
other enumerated factors are sufficiently established. Reducing the requirement
of relatedness to just one of several non-essential factors opens up RICO to the
185. 885 F.2d 1417, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1989).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1426.
188. Compare United States v. Kaplan, 886 F.2d 536, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1989) (two simultaneous bribes to two
city officials could constitute two acts of racketeering activity) with Management Computer Services, Inc. v. Haw-
kins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 883 F.2d 48, 50-51 (7th Cir. 1989) (while unauthorized copying of computer program
may constitute one predicate offense, subsequent use of the stolen product did not create additional acts).
189. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
190. 109 S. Ct. at 2900-01.
191. Supra note 37 and accompanying text.
192. 109 S. Ct. at 2901.
193. Id. at 2899-901.
194. Id. at 2900. The Court adds that each element is a distinct requirement of a RICO pattern. Id. at 2902.
195. 885 F.2d 1162, 1166 (3d Cir. 1989). Continuity and relationship were also comingled in Triad Assoc.,
Inc. v. Chicago Housing Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 1989), which was decided well after H.J. Inc. How-
ever, that appeal was argued before H.J. Inc. was released and does not cite that opinion.
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mere habitiual offender who commits isolated, albeit repeated, crimes in an un-
organized, unplanned, and random fashion. By demanding both relatedness and
continuity, the Supreme Court clearly believed Congress intended to reach a
more narrow and sophisticated band of criminals. 198 Likewise, the other federal
appellate courts compartmentalize the two elements in their own pattern
analysis.19
7
In Swistock v. Jones, another panel of the Third Circuit, this time led by
Judge Slovitor, distinguished between relatedness and continuity and appeared
to require both for a valid RICO pattern. 98 Nevertheless, the court still consid-
ered the similarity of the acts as an element of continuity. 9 How such a factor
demonstrates ongoing criminal activity or the threat thereof is unclear. Without
question, similarity of the acts is just another term for relatedness. Such blur-
ring of the fine line between relatedness and continuity allows both elements to
be satisfied - theoretically - by conduct comprised merely of similar acts.
Ironically, this is the opposite result from that achieved in Shearin which al-
lowed a RICO pattern to be continuous without necessarily exhibiting related-
ness. Neither is analytically sound. The more rational approach treats similarity
of the acts as evincing only relatedness and not continuity. 00
While clearly distinct, relatedness between acts may still "be established in
a number of ways." 0' Because RICO was drafted with "a desire to avoid creat-
ing loopholes for clever defendants and their lawyers," 202 courts should be re-
ceptive to new and novel methods of satisfying this requirement. H.J. Inc. ac-
knowledges implicitly that relatedness is not an overly restrictive component of
a RICO pattern.2 03 Indeed, the "or otherwise" language of the Dangerous Spe-
cial Offender Sentencing Act20 4 clearly suggests that this definition is not all-
encompassing. 201
This conclusion does not imply, however, that relatedness is without mean-
ing. In determining what characteristics properly demonstrate interrelationship
among acts attributed to a defendant, RICO's legislative purpose and history
must, of course, be the guide.208 Therefore, relationships which suggest organ-
ized and systematic criminal conduct may satisfy the requirement. At the other
extreme, relationships which are purely coincidental, fortuitous, or inherent in
all criminal acts, mark activity which is properly characterized as random, un-
organized, and outside RICO's purview. Employing this analysis, the mere fact
196. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
197. See, e.g., Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 994-95 (8th Cir. 1989); Phelps v.
Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir. 1989); Jacobson v. Cooper, 882 F.2d 717, 720 (2d Cir.
1989),
198. 884 F.2d 755, 757-59 (3d Cir. 1989).
199. Id. at 758.
200. One panel of the Third Circuit appears to have expressly adopted this properly bifurcated approach,
Marshall-Silver Const. Co. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593, 595 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990).
201. United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers Union, 889 F.2d 1232, 1234 (2d Cir. 1989).
202. Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 1984), affd on
other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
203. 109 S. Ct. at 2901. See also id. at 2907 (Scalia, J., concurring).
204. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
205. See H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2907 (Scalia J., concurring).
206. Id. at 2899. See supra notes 2-22 and accompanying text.
1990]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
that the victims of a crime spree were all women, the acts were all committed to
enrich the defendant, or the conspirators were all co-employees,20 7 would not, by
itself, evince the degree of sophisticated criminal conduct Congress intended to
reach.20 8
One universally overlooked aspect of the relationship prong is its scope.
Without question, this requirement applies to the two predicate acts of racke-
teering activity which the Supreme Court has unequivocally demanded be re-
lated.209 A determination of whether a pattern exists, however, requires an ex-
amination of all relevant events and circumstances and not simply the mere
criminal acts.210 In remanding the case before it, the Court in H.J. Inc. sug-
gested that a pattern "might be established at trial by showing that the alleged
bribes were a regular way of conducting Northwestern Bell's ongoing business,
or a regular way of conduct or participating in the conduct of the alleged and
ongoing RICO enterprise . ". .."I" It naturally follows that activities which
relate to the "purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission,
or otherwise," 212 must be considered even though not constituting predicate of-
fenses as defined in RICO.213 The relationship requirement should therefore be
applied to every act, event, and circumstance purported to evince a RICO pat-
tern. These facts are relevant only if related to each other in a manner which
demonstrates organized and systematic criminal conduct. Acts, events, and cir-
cumstances which are isolated from this course of activity are irrelevant and
serve only to distract the court from the task of discerning a valid RICO
pattern.
C. Continuity
While H.J. Inc.2 14 adds little substance to Sedima's16 discussion of relat-
edness, the opinion expounds somewhat upon the continuity element.2"6 The
Court adopted "a less inflexible" approach to the term derived "from a com-
mon-sense, everyday understanding of RICO's language and Congress' gloss on
it."21 7 Legitimately continuous criminal activities were subdivided into two cate-
gories: closed and open-ended. 21 8 As reported earlier in this Comment, the
207. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2907 (Scalia, J., concurring).
208. This analysis makes no attempt to introduce new and perhaps more amorphous concepts to the pattern
requirement but simply attempts to clarify the Supreme Court's interpretation of legislative intent and provide a
useful approach to applying that intent in practice. See id. at 2901 n.3.
209. Id. at 2900 (citing 116 CONG. REc. 18,940 (1970) (remarks of Senator McClellan); Sedima, 473 U.S.
at 496 n.14 (two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1382-84 (2d Cir. 1989).
211. 109 S. Ct. at 2906.
212. Id. at 2901.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
214. 109 S. Ct. at 2900-01.
215. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
216. 109 S. Ct. at 2901-02. See Marshall-Silver Const. Co. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990).
217. 109 S.Ct. at 2901.
218. Id. at 2902 (citing Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir.
1987)).
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Court offered brief explanations of these concepts and suggested several meth-
ods for demonstrating a sufficiently continuous RICO pattern. 19
Classifying continuous activity as either closed or open-ended signals
whether continuity will be demonstrated by completed conduct or the threat of
further criminal activity. Whether the alleged course of criminal behavior has
been terminated or is ongoing, continuity may always be proven directly where
a series of related predicates extends over a substantial period of time.220 When
an open and ongoing endeavor is presented, however, continuity might also be
evinced by the threat of further racketeering activity.221 Allowing such proof
permits RICO to be invoked quickly without waiting for a sufficiently closed
period of criminal conduct to transpire.222
This distinction between closed and open-ended conduct thus serves a use-
ful purpose. Once the alleged pattern is properly classified, it can be scrutinized
according to the appropriate method of proof. Nevertheless, some courts still
analyze this question without reference to whether closed or open-ended con-
duct is present.223 While this relaxed approach may be acceptable when a valid
pattern is readily apparent, it will likely foster confusion and disarray in more
complex cases.
1. Closed Periods of Racketeering Activity
A closed period of racketeering activity, as its name suggests, involves a
course of criminal conduct which has been completed.22' Although no further
threat of racketeering is present, the events that have already transpired may be
sufficient nonetheless to establish a RICO pattern.225 By the literal dictates of
H.J. Inc, the proper focus is upon the duration of the alleged predicate acts.
Only "long-term criminal conduct," "over a substantial period," may constitute
a pattern within a closed time frame. 221 In clarifying what long term means, the
Court suggested only that predicate offenses lasting merely "a few weeks or
months" would not be sufficient. 2 7 Precisely what a substantial period of time
requires is left for the lower courts to determine on a case-by-case basis. Never-
theless, H.J. Inc., read literally, limits the continuity analysis to a mere dura-
tional test when no threat of further racketeering activity is present. Several
219. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
220. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902; See also Walk v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 890 F.2d 688, 690 (4th Cir.
1989) ("the sheer duration of criminal activity might demonstrate the requisite continuity .... ").
221. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902. See also Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir.
1989); Service Eng'g Co. v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1500, 1508 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
222. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902.
223. United States v. Kaplan, 886 F.2d 536, 542-43 (2d Cir. 1989); Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 677-78
(4th Cir. 1989).
224. See. e.g., Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1989); Sutherland v.
O'Malley, 882 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1989); Parcoil Corp. v. Nowsco Well Serv., Ltd., 887 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1989).
225. Walk v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 890 F.2d 688, 690 (4th Cir. 1989); Hutchinson v. Wickes Co., 726
F. Supp. 1315, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 1989). However, at least one court has misconstrued H.J. Inc. to require a "threat
of continuing racketeering activity" in all circumstances. Halperin v. Jasper, 723 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (E.D. Pa.
1989).
226. H.J., Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902.
227. Id. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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courts have closely followed this narrow approach and limited their inquiry to
the length of time between predicate acts. 28
This possible interpretation of H.J. Inc. appears, however, to violate the
Court's own declaration that a natural and commonsense approach to RICO's
pattern definition is required. 229 Obviously, the opinion must be read as a whole
and against the backdrop of prior decisions of the Court. While useful, a
mechanical accounting of the number of days between predicates cannot, in all
instances, identify precisely those individuals Congress had targeted.
A simple hypothetical example demonstrates the incongruity of such a
rigid approach: Suppose two dishonest entrepreneurs, A and B, operating rival
businesses in the same town, independently embark on identical schemes to
bribe city officials and procure government contracts. Because A is more expedi-
tious than B, he completes his venture within a month. B, however, is more
dilatory and spends over a year delivering her bribes to the same individuals.
Both A and B receive a contract and quickly complete it, thus concluding closed
periods of racketeering activity. No further threat of criminal conduct was evi-
dent. Under a literal reading of H.J. Inc., A would not be indictable pursuant to
RICO because his scheme did not extend over a substantial period of time. On
the other hand, B would be amenable to the statute due only to her procrastina-
tion. Certainly, Congress did not intend that A's efficient completion of his
scheme would by itself remove him from the reach of RICO. In his concur-
rence, Justice Scalia noted that this narrow approach which focuses only upon
the time span between the predicate offenses will create a "safe harbor for rack-
eteering activity that does not last too long, no matter how many different
crimes and different schemes are involved .... 230
Rather than allow such an anomaly, courts should also assess non-dura-
tional factors when determining whether a closed period of criminal conduct
constitutes a sufficient pattern of racketeering activity. These considerations in-
clude the number of victims, presence of separate and independent schemes,
commission of varying predicate acts, and so forth.23 1 Such an approach com-
ports with language elsewhere in H.J. Inc. calling for flexibility.2"2 Moreover,
this reasoning furthers Congress' express desire to create a loosely defined stat-
ute free of loopholes.2 3 Therefore, when a completed criminal endeavor involves
predicate acts extending over less than a substantial period of time, continuity
might be established by the existence of other factors indicating that such con-
228. See, e.g., Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, 893 F.2d 441, 446-47 (1st Cir. 1990); Eastern Publishing and
Advertising, Inc. v. Chesapeake Publishing and Advertising, Inc., 895 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1990); Rodriguez v.
Banco Cent., 727 F. Supp. 759, 773 (D.P.R. 1989); Dooner v. NMI Ltd., 725 F. Supp. 153, 161-62 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); North Star Contracting v. Long Island R.R. Co., 723 F. Supp. 902, 906-07 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Perez-Rubio
v. Wyckoff, 718 F. Supp. 217, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); West Mountain Sales, Inc. v. Logan Mfg. Co., 718 F. Supp.
1084, 1087 (N.D.N.Y. 1989); Obee v. Teleshare, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 913, 916 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
229. 109 S. Ct. at 2899.
230. Id. at 2908 (Scalia, J., concurring).
231. See supra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
232. 109 S. Ct. at 2900.
233. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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duct was not sporadic. 2 4 Such cases will be rare, however, and difficult to prove
because a strong common-sense presumption exists against finding a pattern of
criminal activity within a brief span of time.
This flexible multifactor approach to continuity is far more useful, how-
ever, in weeding out complaints alleging numerous predicate acts over a sub-
stantial period of time but still not involving long-term organized criminal con-
duct. While the existence of racketeering activity over a number of years may
satisfy the continuity requirement, this is not always the case. 235 Several post-
H.J. Inc. courts have employed non-durational considerations more as a means
of disposing of such invalid RICO suits.213
Unfortunately, the federal judiciary already appears to be divided over this
question of whether the continuity prong is necessarily satisfied by two or more
predicates committed over a substantial period of time. The leading case in sup-
port of this position is Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion.23 7 In that action, ninety-five
fraudulent letters were alleged to have been delivered via the U.S. Mail over a
four and one-half year period creating a pattern of racketeering activity.238 The
First Circuit Court of Appeals felt obligated by H.J. Inc. to abandon its multi-
factor, fact-intensive balancing test and adopt the Supreme Court's bifurcated
framework of relatedness and continuity.239 Precisely why the panel believed
these approaches were mutually exclusive is unclear. Nevertheless, the district
court's decision dismissing the complaint was reversed and the case re-
manded.2 0 The Court of Appeals held that allegations of multiple predicate
acts over a substantial period of time was enough, by itself and notwithstanding
234. See, e.g., Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 926, 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (pattern
found where numerous predicate acts extended over eight and one-half months in complex conspiracy).
235. Hutchinson v. Wickes Cos., 726 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 1989); cf. Atlas Pile Driving Co. v.
DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 994-95 (8th Cir. 1989) (relevant conduct lasted for over three years and involved
multiple schemes, participants, victims, and a complex course of activity thus establishing a pattern).
236. See, e.g., Menasco, Inc. v. Wasserman, 886 F.2d 681, 684-85 (4th Cir. 1989) (events took place over
approximately a year but involved only one perpetrator, victim, and goal); Sutherland v. O'Malley, 882 F.2d 1196,
1203-05 (7th Cir. 1989) (relevant conduct extended over five months but involved only one scheme, victim, and
economic injury.); Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 595-96 (7th Cir. 1989) (endeavor
lasted for over two years but only one scheme was alleged, two transactions were involved, and one victim was
injured by a single type of injury); Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Aero Voyagers, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 579, 584-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (relevant acts occurred over thirteen months but there were merely three participants, one vic-
tim, and a single uncomplicated transaction); Disandro-Smith Assoc. P.C. v. Edron Copier Serv., Inc., 722 F.
Supp. 912, 915-16 (D.R.I. 1989) (while spanning two years, conduct involved only the sale of three used copy
machines); Hutchinson v. Wickes Cos., 726 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (although involving conduct
over several years, acts alleged did not comprise a pattern due to the nature of the offenses); Benard v. Hoff, 727
F. Supp. 211, 215-17 (D. Md. 1989) (numerous predicate acts were extended over a period of nearly three years
but conduct involved a single scheme with one goal and an isolated victim); Pyramid Sec. Ltd. v. Int'l Bank, 726
F. Supp. 1377, 1382-85 (D.D.C. 1989) (single scheme lasted three months and involved similar predicate acts, one
victim, and a single economic injury); Cross v. Simons, 729 F. Supp. 588, 594-96 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (scheme cover-
ing a three and one-half year period attempted to defraud one victim and inflict a single economic injury through
multiple acts of mail and wire fraud); Trundy v. Strumsky, 729 F. Supp. 178, 183-85 (D. Mass. 1990) (acts
extended over nine months, at best, but there was only one victim, a single purpose, and an isolated injury); USA
Network v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 304, 316-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (single uncomplicated scheme over
three and one-half month period with few criminal acts, participants, and victims).
237. 893 F.2d 441 (Ist Cir. 1990).
238. Id. at 444.
239. Id. at 445-46.
240. Id. at 448.
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any other counterveiling non-durational factors, to satisfy the continuity re-
quirement necessary for a RICO pattern.241 Thus, the court interpreted H.J.
Inc. as rendering irrelevant the uncontroverted fact that this was merely a single
scheme by a lone perpetrator with one objective committing numerous identical
acts of mail fraud and inflicting a single economic injury upon an isolated
victim.
Chief Judge Campbell, writing for the unanimous panel, cited the Third
Circuit's opinion in Swistock v. Jones 42 to support the proposition that a mul-
tifactor approach is no longer appropriate in light of H.J. Inc. 243 This reliance is
misplaced as that decision merely reasoned that a single injury against a limited
number of victims was not dispositive in favor of dismissing the complaint for
failure to allege a sufficient pattern.2 "4 The Swistock panel did not purport, in
any sense, to abandon all reference to non-durational factors when determining
whether continuity is present within a closed period.
Indeed, in Marshall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel, a subsequent panel of
the Third Circuit expressly rejected the idea that patterns of racketeering activ-
ity may be discerned in such cases without considering non-durational fac-
tors.2 4 5 The court noted that such a narrow examination would allow the con-
tinuity element to be satisfied by a limited number of predicates which
happened to extend over a substantial period of time. This result would clearly
be untenable where, for example, these offenses were all part of an isolated,
uncomplicated scheme inflicting an isolated injury upon a lone victim.2 46 The
Third Circuit therefore refused to recogonize a bright-line rule validating all
RICO complaints alleging predicate offenses sufficiently separated in time.
This more common-sense approach espoused in Marshall-Silver Constr.
Co. is plainly preferable to the hard-and-fast standard employed in Fleet Credit
Corp. Such a view is more consistent with H.J. Inc.'s desire for flexibility.247
While the Supreme Court did declare that "[p]redicate acts extending over a
few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy
this [continuity] requirement," this statement obviously does not foreclose the
possibility that conduct sufficiently spread out in time might not be continuous
either.2 48 Proper evaluation of all relevant factors, durational and non-dura-
tional, will further Congress' goal of eradicating the long-term organized crimi-
nal offender.249 Both Congress and the Supreme Court have consistently
avoided injecting bright-line rules into federal RICO no matter how tempting.
Accordingly, there is no valid basis for the proposition that a pattern exists
241. Id. at 447.
242. 884 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1989).
243. Sion, 893 F.2d at 446.
244. Swistock, 884 F.2d at 758-59.
245. 894 F.2d 593, 596-98 (3d Cir. 1990). This reasoning constitutes dicta, however, as the court concluded
that even if continuity was defined solely in terms of duration, the seven month scheme alleged would still not
withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 597.
246. Id. at 597.
247. 109 S. Ct. at 2900.
248. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., Management Computer Services, Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 883 F.2d 48, 51 (7th
Cir. 1989). See also supra note 3 and accompanying text (purpose of federal RICO).
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whenever two or more related predicated acts are committed over a substantial
period of time. While highly indicative of continuous behavior, such factors are
not necessarily dispositive.
The range of durational and non-durational factors potentially relevant to
the question of whether continuity exists in a closed period of conduct is indeed
broad. As similarly explained in the discussion of relatedness,2 50 courts should
examine any fact, event, or circumstance which tends to suggest that the series
of criminal activities was not sporadic. Of course, no one factor is dispositive,
requiring a case-by-case approach to the question of continuity.2"'
2. Open-Ended Periods of Racketeering Activity
In contrast to a closed period of racketeering activity, open-endedness ex-
ists when RICO is invoked prior to completion of the course of criminal con-
duct.252 Continuity may be demonstrated at that point in either of two ways.
First, two or more predicate acts may already have been committed permitting
proof in a manner identical to that required for a closed period a.25 Alternatively,
a plaintiff or prosecutor can establish continuity by establishing the existence of
a threat of further racketeering activity.254 Because an additional means of sat-
isfying the continuity requirement is available when the alleged criminal con-
duct is open and ongoing, a RICO pattern is more likely to be found than in a
closed and finite endeavor.
A RICO indictment or complaint is therefore properly characterized as
open-ended when it sufficiently alleges a threat of further racketeering activity.
Of course in the civil context, such pleadings must be founded upon "reasonable
inquiry" and "grounded in fact.12 5  Moreover, when fraud is alleged, as is com-
mon, the circumstances constituting such must be stated with particularity.25
In a criminal application of RICO, expectations of responsible prosecutorial dis-
cretion act as an analogous check.257 Properly employed, these safeguards
should guarantee that closed periods of racketeering activity are not mis-
characterized as open-ended.
Similarly, a defendant cannot convert his ongoing activities into a closed
course of conduct by terminating his offensive operations once the threat of
250. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
251. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902. See also Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755, 758 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding
that infliction of a single harm on a limited number of victims was not dispositive in favor of dismissal).
252. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902.
253. See Id. at 2906; Reeder v. Kermit Johnson, Alphagraphics, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1428, 1435-36 (D. Utah
1989) (although criminal conduct alleged to be ongoing, such proof was not necessary as transpired events were
already sufficient to establish a pattern).
254. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902. A complaint properly alleging a threat of further racketeering activity is
therefore much harder to dispose of summarily. See, e.g., Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l AFL-CIO, 901
F.2d 404, 433 (5th Cir. 1990); Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffers & Helpers, Local Union 639, 883
F.2d 132, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
255. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See Flannery v. IFA Inc., 722 F. Supp. 498, 501 (N.D. Il. 1989).
256. FED. R Civ. P. 9(b). See Manasco, Inc. v. Wasserman, 886 F.2d 681, 684 (4th Cir. 1989); Blake v.
Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365, 1372 (9th Cir. 1988); Reinfeld v. Riklis, 722 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Hutton v. Klabal, 726 F. Supp. 67, 71-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
257. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 502-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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RICO emerges. Indeed, one purpose of allowing a demonstration of a threat of
further racketeering activity is to avoid creating loopholes in RICO for clever
individuals who abort their criminal schemes once the statute has been invoked.
Thus, the threat of further racketeering may be discerned from the nature of
the relevant conduct 258 and need not specifically exist at the moment RICO is
instigated.2 59 As already discussed, the Supreme Court suggested several meth-
ods by which such an allegation could be satisfactorily demonstrated.2 60
When the predicate offenses are closely related in time, RICO's pattern
requirement can still be met, therefore, if a sufficient threat of racketeering
activity can be shown. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the man-
ner in which this may be accomplished just prior to the announcement of H.J.
Inc. in United States v. Indelicato 1 In a classic application of RICO against a
traditional mobster, the only predicate acts alleged were the simultaneous
murders of a mafia boss and his two associates. 26 1 Obviously, the closed interval
between these offenses was extremely brief and did not constitute a substantial
period of time in any sense. Nevertheless, the court held that facts external to
these murders could demonstrate a sufficient threat of further criminal conduct
and therefore satisfy the continuity requirement. 263 In that case, the nature of
the enterprise, an organized crime family, and the defendant's intentions of as-
suming control of it by means of the three murders allowed the jury to infer
that such a threat existed. 64 The Second Circuit felt no need to modify this
analysis after H.J. Inc. was handed down.265 Indeed, while the Supreme Court
did not specifically cite Indelicato, it clearly affirmed that the nature of the
defendant's conduct and the operation of the enterprise may indicate a threat of
further racketeering activity.266 Therefore, in determining whether a course of
criminal conduct is sufficiently open-ended and ongoing to satisfy the continuity
requirement, a court must examine every fact, event, and circumstance properly
related to the predicate offenses.2 67 If a substantial threat of further racketeer-
ing activity is present, a valid RICO pattern exists no matter how short the
span between the predicate acts. Of course, the inquiry must be limited to
whether a threat of racketeering activity exists and not simply further criminal
conduct in general. 268 This approach avoids creating a loophole in RICO for
racketeers who are engaged in long-term criminal activity but are only caught
committing predicate offenses within a brief period of time, as in Indelicato. It
also allows RICO to be used proscriptively without forcing a plaintiff or prose-
258. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902.
259. Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 724 F. Supp. 259, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); accord Sun Say. & Loan Assoc. v.
Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 194 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987).
260. Supra note 157 and accompanying text.
261. 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989).
262. Id. at 1372.
263. Id. at 1382-84.
264. Id. at 1384-85.
265. United States v. Kaplan, 886 F.2d 536, 541-43 (2d Cir. 1989) (following Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370).
This approach was similarly adopted in United States v. Hobson, 893 F.2d 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 1990).
266. H.J., Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902.
267. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
268. Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, 893 F.2d 441, 448 (1st Cir. 1990).
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cutor to wait until sufficient predicate offenses have been completed before in-
voking the statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given Congress' desire to avoid in RICO the exceptions and loopholes
often created by bright-lines and strict rules, a precise definition of a pattern of
racketeering activity is not possible. H.J. Inc. presents, nevertheless, a helpful
discussion of what the term generally does and does not mean. Once courts
begin applying this analysis uniformly on a case-by-case basis, much of the dis-
order and confusion that has troubled judges and commentators will begin to
subside.
H.J. Inc. and subsequent case law have begun to reveal a consistent ap-
proach to the pattern requirement. A court must ask first whether two acts of
racketeering activity exist. If so, it must then determine whether they are satis-
factorily related. If those two conditions are met, a consideration of continuity is
required. Every fact, event, and circumstance related to the predicate acts may
be potentially helpful. A closed course of criminal conduct may be shown to be
sufficiently continuous by demonstrating numerous participants or victims, sev-
eral distinct injuries, different crimes, multiple schemes, or any other evidence
indicating such conduct was not sporadic. While highly relevant, the time span
between the predicate acts is not dispositive one way or the other. If continuity
within a closed period cannot be shown, an open and ongoing endeavor may be
established by a threat of further racketeering activity. An examination of the
nature of the predicate offenses, enterprise, and defendant's conduct may reveal
that such a propensity does exist. If, and only if, these requirements of two
predicate acts, relatedness, and continuity are satisfied, a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity has been established.
Paul William Flowers
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